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Abstract 
This philosophical paper suggests that almost all academic research, including qualitative 
research, is conducted under the influence of a "technicity paradigm" which values objectivity, 
generalisability and rationality. This paper explores, from a Heideggerian perspective, the 
fundamental characteristics of research under the influence of technicity and discusses how these 
characteristics manifest in qualitative research. It includes a reflection on what qualitative 
research might be like if it could escape the influence of technicity and realise its potential for 
inclusive and relevant knowledge making. 
Key Words: Heidegger, Phenomenology, Philosophy, Rationalism, Paradigms, Research 
Techniques 
I. Introduction 
Qualitative research holds the promise of an escape from smug, exploitive, scientistic, reductivist 
research. It has the potential to restore respect for ontological integrity and to bring worldly 
engagement back into knowing. It has the capacity to replace esoterica with relevance. But does 
qualitative research deliver on its promise; does it achieve its potential? In too many instances, it 
does not. This is because, too often, qualitative research places the emphasis on research, which 
undermines qualitative reflection. Within the philosophical framework of Heideggerian 
phenomenology (Heidegger, 1954/1977a), research is the arrogant hallmark of our modern 
existence under the influence of what Heidegger (1952/1977b) calls "technicity" (Technik in 
German). 
This paper explores some of the founding assumptions and values of the technicity paradigm, 
and explicates alternative assumptions and values that might characterise qualitative reflection 
(rather than research) influenced by Heideggerian phenomenology. Such an exploration is 
needed because even qualitative researchers still seem to be under the covert influence of 
technicity while they overtly reject many of the trappings of scientism and positivism. While 
there is no reason why qualitative researchers should abandon their technicity-influenced 
approach, I think their accounts of their work would be more internally consistent if they 
acknowledged the scientistic and positivistic tentacles that still have a grip on their thinking.  
This paper outlines the characteristics of research under the influence of the technicity paradigm 
and provides some examples of how such characteristics are manifest in qualitative research. It 
concludes with a picture of what qualitative research might look like if it were approached with a 
phenomenological attitude.  
II. RESEARCH IN THE EPOCH OF TECHNCITY 
According to Heidegger, we live in an epoch of technicity. At the root of the epoch of technicity 
lies a belief in rationality as a solution to almost every problem, but especially to problems of 
control (Heidegger, 1954/1977a, 1952/1977b). The epoch of technicity is also characterised by 
scientism, specialisation and abstraction. Many of these characteristics are manifest in 
"research," a special way of making, acquiring and evaluating knowledge based on 
specialisation, efficiency of knowledge production (Heidegger, 1954/1977a), and detachment of 
what is studied from its usual context so that researchers can focus on the area of special interest 
and be most efficient (Heidegger, 1927/1996). This detachment is the origin of abstraction. 
"Research," in a Heideggerian scheme, is the rigorous, institutionalised pursuit of certainty 
through rational, objective representation of experience.  
"Research" as a manifestation of the epoch of technicity is distinguished from "reflection" as a 
way of acquiring knowledge (Heidegger, 1954/1977c). Reflection is "calm, self-possessed 
surrender to that which is worthy of questioning." (Heidegger, 1954/1977c, p. 180) In contrast, 
research involves the frantic accumulation of specialist data for its own sake, as the basis for 
expertise and for the power to control the territory defined as the specialist discipline. To 
facilitate this accumulation, research relies on agreed and controllable methods for accumulating 
and evaluating knowledge to permit division of labour and a faster aggregation of a body of 
knowledge valuable to the discipline (Heidegger, 1954/1977a). These "methods" rely on and 
create the characteristics of research-driven knowledge making in the epoch of technicity: 
scientism, specialisation, abstraction and rationalism. 
A. Scientism 
Scientism characterises research in the epoch of technicity not just because people count and 
measure empirical phenomena but because, from their standpoint of belief in one people-centred 
scenario of knowledge production or another, an entire schema of operation emerges that 
determines their research. Heidegger (1954/1977a) calls such a schema "the rule and law of 
science" and says science requires "binding adherence" to that rule and law. Kuhn (1970) calls 
this phenomenon "a paradigm."  
The rule of science refers to the prescription of a domain, a set of practices and an attitude to the 
world. These are the equivalents of such Kuhnian paradigm elements as world view, values, 
techniques, symbolic generalisations and exemplars. The law of science manages the match 
between the rule of science and the knowledge emerging from that rule, ensuring that the rule 
adjusts so that it is never too out of sync with what is known. Kuhn discusses the rule and law of 
science in terms of how "normal science" deals with minor anomalies between paradigm-
sanctioned "facts" and emerging, contrary ones. "Normal science" is characterised as like-
minded members of a discipline community engaging in a respectful struggle with competing 
ideas to resolve minor theoretical or methodological disagreements.  
The rule and law of science (paradigms) create a closed system of knowing that permits what 
Hacking (1992) calls "the self-vindication of science": whatever science discovers or proves 
emerges from and fits within its closed system of paradigm understanding which is self-
certifying. What is certified is what fits the paradigm understanding. If the new knowledge 
doesn't fit, it is usually assumed that there was something wrong with the methodology that 
produced it, rarely with the paradigm understanding itself.  
We see this concern with getting the methodology right and operating within the agreed scenario 
of knowledge production in debates about what constitutes good qualitative research practice 
across many fields that use qualitative methods (e.g., Ackroyd, 1996; Drisko, 1997; Gordon, 
1999; Orosz, 1997; Rennie, 1998). We also see the hunger for a defined rule and law to close the 
system of qualitative research in support for various methodological ideologies; for example, 
semiotics (Valentine, 1996); Husserlian phenomenology (Giorgi, 1997; Roberts, 1997); 
grounded theory (Goulding, 1998; Rennie, 1998); realism (Healy & Perry, 2000) and social 
constructivism (Hackley, 1998). Each of these research specialisms equally, by virtue of being 
underpinned by an ideology that excludes as much as it includes, falls prey to the scientism of 
the epoch of technicity.  
For example, the world of symbols studied by a semiotician would be a poor basis for theorising 
by a grounded theorist or Husserlian phenomenologist who must "bracket" (exclude) their 
preconceptions (King, 1994, p. 27; Husserl, 1973), while to semioticians, people who believe in 
"things in themselves" probably seem to have only a crude and naïve appreciation of their own 
experiences. Social constructivists believe the realist world of absolute phenomena is 
unknowable (Collins, 1985), while realists wonder what the point of knowledge making is if 
there is no underpinning reality to support it, only social interpretations (Hasse, Krucken, & 
Weingart, 1994). 
Binding adherence to the rule and law of any "science" requires a form of blindness to excluded 
possibilities, even though those possibilities are the basis of other disciplines. The origin and 
effect of this blindness caused by the phenomenon of "thematisation" is discussed in greater 
detail in the next section. But to understand Heidegger's concept of scientism and my contention 
that most qualitative research is scientistic, we also need to explore further, the idea of binding 
adherence, another important characteristic of scientism in the epoch of technicity. Why it is 
important will also emerge in the next section. 
People who don't adhere to the rule and law of their discipline, who fail to toe the paradigm line, 
are considered incompetent and unreliable outsiders; to be an insider is to understand and accept 
the rule and law of one's paradigm and to work to maintain them.  
To put it more colloquially, to be an insider is to be judged by one's peers to be competent, 
professional, skilled, reliable, to be accepted by one's peers as a "good operator," someone who 
understands and respects professional standards, values and practices, who does things the "right 
way." An outsider is someone who doesn't accept what counts as quality research and who wants 
to work outside the paradigm guidelines and prescriptions.  
But it is important to distinguish between people who operate outside a paradigm or who don't 
adhere to the rule and law of science because they are sloppy, careless or ignorant of the "right 
way," and those who operate outside a paradigm by conscious choice, by rejecting the limitations 
of the paradigm because the paradigm cannot accommodate their results or because it limits the 
approach they choose to embrace. The outsiders I am contrasting to paradigm insiders are the 
consciously unconventional, people who I like to say have "the courage to be incompetent" 
(Steiner, 1998). Historically, many paradigm outsiders are ultimately recognised as innovators 
and paradigm shifters within their discipline communities, but only after their outsider views are 
welcomed inside, usually after many long and painful years of ridicule and rejection by their 
discipline communities and their journals. 
This paper is an outsider paper because although I identify with the qualitative research 
community, I am challenging the foundations of qualitative research. When I try to do my 
research with my Heideggerian values and beliefs, I am often conscious of being considered 
insufficiently rigorous for not following conventional qualitative methods. When I teach research 
students my values and beliefs, I am seen as an amusing heretic who can even be a bit dangerous 
to know when one is trying to produce a conventional (passable) qualitative thesis or 
dissertation. Because I don't feel bound to adhere to any one predominant rule and law of the 
various qualitative research paradigms, I exist as a somewhat incompetent outsider to them all.  
In summary, in the epoch of technicity, scientism requires that those who engage in research 
choose their paradigm and adhere to its rule and law if they wish to be seen as competent 
members of their discipline community. It seems to me that this scenario of scientism is quite a 
good description of most approaches to qualitative research. 
B. Specialisation and Abstraction 
Research communities both reflect and encourage research specialisation. Specialisation is a 
response to the technicity-inspired desire for control. It is easier to control the small and simple 
than the big and complex. In rendering phenomena manageable, the domain of interest narrows. 
This is where experts, as opposed to polymaths, come from. 
Specialisation is also a response to the technicity-inspired pursuit of efficiency. The most 
effective way to improve the efficiency of research is to narrow the field of study and increase 
the number of knowledge-makers who can work cooperatively on the task. Think of the 
efficiency of the internationally dispersed human genome project. 
The most effective way to narrow the field of study is to detach (physically or conceptually) the 
objects of study from their complicated contexts. This is the essence of the reductivism and 
abstraction that characterise Western thinking in this epoch and that produce research specialties. 
For example, to understand a culture, some researchers study texts, others study oral history, 
others study rituals, others study family dynamics, others study gender relationships - and too 
rarely is there convergence or cross-pollination. Heidegger calls this process of reduction and 
abstraction that characterises research "thematisation," reducing holistic phenomena (like 
culture) to nothing more than a narrowly conceived abstract theme for research (like rituals or 
oral history).  
The most effective way to enable more people to work cooperatively in the same discipline is to 
render their diversity uniform or immaterial to the work. This is the origin of the myth of 
objectivity as an aim and prescription for effective knowledge making. The scientist isn't 
supposed to matter. Of course, in qualitative research, we own up to our subjectivity, but I'll now 
explain how that doesn't stop us from rendering ourselves uniform.  
1. Thematisation of the World 
Heidegger (1927/1996) described a holistic, concrete world constituted by all our life 
experiences, even the mundane and fleeting, and both personal experiences and those handed 
down to us by others through education and socialisation. The phenomena of all these 
experiences are linked together to create their significance, their ontological essence, the 
concrete world of our experience. The connectedness of this holistic world is undermined by 
thematisation that detaches phenomena and people from their places within its context. 
Thematisation is the mechanism for delimiting domains of research interest. Thematisation 
confines a researcher's focus to the "theme" of most interest to the researcher's paradigm. 
Thematisation influences how much of the holistic concrete world we experience because 
thematisation determines how open we are to the holistic world, how much we are prepared to 
consider significant. For example (see below), if all the interconnected coloured spheres together 
represent a multi-dimensional culture, each of the red geometric outlines represents how research 
themes (rituals, texts, history) frame and exclude some of the other dimensions of the culture.  
Figure 1 
 
Researchers are usually open only to experiences that fit the pre-determined paradigm 
boundaries of their research specialty. These boundaries effectively detach phenomena from their 
holistic context by rendering other phenomena in that context insignificant or irrelevant to the 
research task, outside the boundary of the theme. This reduction simplifies the phenomena of 
interest (inside the boundary), but it diminishes their concreteness by ignoring their contextuality 
(which extends outside the boundary). This is the essence of abstraction -- taking something 
away from its concrete context and reducing and simplifying it. This is how researchers create 
abstract theory and create theory-practice gaps. 
For example, qualitative management researchers regularly reduce people to abstract 
"employees" by detaching them from their holistic context. This detachment excludes 
experiences and phenomena unrelated to the employing organisation or work matters. They then 
study these abstractions within the limited context of a human resource or industrial relations 
management issue or problem (their theme). What they learn through such research is often 
difficult to re-integrate with the complex context of a real organisation populated by real people 
with lives beyond the organisation and their jobs (Hartshorn, 1997). The theory-practice gap is 
created.  
For example, if one is interested in studying how job security affects a person's commitment to 
their employer (the research question), one would ask people questions about how job security 
makes them feel about their employer, how they think their employer feels about them, and how 
their job security affects the way they approach their job and think about their career. But if the 
research is done within the narrow themes of workplace relations or conditions of employment or 
staff retention, then researchers might never uncover the effect of family responsibilities or non-
work related personal ambitions on how job security affects workers.  
In one study (Kunda, 1994), an ethnographer exploring the theme of organisational culture and 
refusing to be bound by any methodological constraints, found that a job-for-life policy at one 
workplace made people feel trapped because, although they were unhappy in their work, they felt 
they couldn't quit because doing so required them to reject absolute financial security which they 
considered too important to their families to sacrifice. The same pressure might thwart any desire 
to leave work to pursue a selfish pleasure like travelling the globe or to commit to an altruistic 
task like doing relief work in a foreign land. These concerns would normally lie outside the 
thematic boundaries of qualitative research on workplace relations, conditions of employment or 
staff retention. They may also be considered beyond the scope of the research question. Yet, 
without these insights, the significance of anything people might say about their enthusiasm for 
job security or their commitment to staying with an employer would be, to use Heidegger's term, 
"deficient." (Heidegger, 1927/1996, p. 53). Not wrong, not mistaken, just not all it could be, due 
to self-imposed thematic blindness.  
Likewise, qualitative market research reduces people to consumers (Gabriel & Lang, 1995); 
social work does qualitative research on clients (Halmi, 1996); and librarians qualitatively study 
users (Park, 1994). These italicised terms represent the thematic reduction of whole, rounded 
human beings who exist in complex networks of relationships and experiences into abstracted 
entities confined to the thematic framework of a discipline. Who of us ever think of ourselves as 
consumers, as patients of our doctors, as users of our libraries? I never thought of my foster 
daughter or myself as clients of our social worker. These are abstract, constructed and 
diminished personas that exist only within the boundaries of a research theme and within the 
imaginations of discipline-bound researchers. They exist as types, samples or respondents. 
Heidegger says researchers "dream" them (Heidegger, 1975/1988, p. 54). Outside those thematic 
boundaries, these personas blossom into human beings of unknowable complexity and 
distinction.  
2. Thematisation of Researchers 
Thematisation also reduces researchers who feel compelled to conform to the parameters and 
interests of their discipline, to confine their interests and efforts to their specialised abstract 
world. Researchers are said to be reduced because, in a Heideggerian scheme, we are the world 
we experience. Without a concrete world to fill our lives with meaning, we are an empty space, 
what Heidegger (1927/1996) calls "the there." 
Interestingly, Heidegger claims the world does not have meaning; it has only significance. Only 
people have meaning. Only people can be meaning-ful, full of the significance of the world. 
(Heidegger, 1927/1996, p. 142) When we are filled with a thematically reduced world of 
significance, we are less meaningful. When we thematise, we reduce ourselves to a discipline-
defined identity. We become merely researchers rather than whole and diverse individuals with a 
more meaningful identity and a more significant world in which to exist. Bochner (1997) 
provides an excellent insight into how this reduction feels.  
Each of the red geometric outlines referred to as research themes in the illustrations above 
actually represent the shape of the researchers who approach the world thematically (their 
professional personas). Each shape is a "there" delineated by its commitment to a certain way of 
looking at the world, as a semiotician, as a textual analyst, as a grounded theorist. What is inside 
the geometric outline is what makes the personas meaningful. The less there is in there, the less 
meaningful the researchers are as human beings. People who are not able to embrace all their 
possibilities because of, in this case, professional constraints, can be expected to sometimes feel 
"deficient" themselves and, in response, seek new careers or lifestyles, or opportunities to break 
out of their paradigm. (Saying someone is less meaningful or deficient is not a judgement on 
their worth. It suggests they are denying themselves existential possibilities.) 
Researchers are also reduced in another way by thematisation. To be human, in a Heideggerian 
scheme, is to be in-the-world, to be involved with the holistic world from a unique place in it. 
Each person has the ontological potential to experience the world from a unique perspective. 
(See the first two frames below.) But when people create abstract worlds through identification 
with a discipline or profession, their unique place in the world disappears and is replaced by an 
impersonal "one," as in "doing what one does." "One's place" is dictated by one's thematic area 
of interest (paradigm). (See the third frame below.)  
Researchers committed to the same paradigm stand in much the same place in the world, and 
their perspective is confined to the bounds of their paradigm. Their experiences and possibilities 
are diminished, they are less meaningful as human beings, and their subjectivity is no longer 
personal or unique.  
Figure 2 
 
This loss of a uniquely personal role or place in experience is acknowledged in the concept of 
objectivity. But restrictive paradigm boundaries also alter one's subjectivity, one's perspective, 
one's sense of one's place in the world. Paradigm subjectivity looks like objectivity because it is 
neither personal nor unique. 
The similarity between subjectivity and objectivity can be seen in concerns about validity and 
reliability, which are no less popular in qualitative research (Hall & Rist, 1999; Healy & Perry, 
2000; Kirk & Miller, 1986; Seale & Silverman, 1997; Sykes, 1990) than they are in quantitative 
research. These concerns relate to objectivity because such concerns grow out of residual realist 
beliefs in "accurate," paradigm-sanctioned experience from which the human variable has been 
removed. But they persist in qualitative research as well, despite a seeming commitment to 
infinite personal or interpersonal (subjective) interpretations of experience that could never 
approach "accuracy." But under the influence of technicity, even qualitative research paradigms 
sanction only experiences attained from certain paradigm-approved perspectives or through 
paradigm-sanctioned methodologies.  
For example, triangulation is used to increase the validity and reliability of subjective findings 
(Williamson, 2000). Williamson says, "The advantage of triangulation is that conclusions are 
likely to be more reliable if data are collected by more than one method and from the perspective 
of more than one person" (p. 36) and "ethnographers attempt to develop dense and widely scoped 
texts whose validity can be ensured through the use of triangulation" (p. 166). 
But the very ideas of validity and reliability are inconsistent with the uniqueness of individual 
perceptions and are based on positivist assumptions about truth. The idea of validity assumes that 
what we measure or observe has an existence beyond our experience of it; validity is how close 
we get to that "real" existence. Validity is based on the traditional realist assumption that 
underpins the correspondence theory of truth (Russell, 1912). The idea of reliability values ideas 
or beliefs that have consistency or persistence over time. This is the basis for the coherence 
theory of truth (Bradley, 1914). As positivist concepts, both of these ideas have their roots firmly 
in rationalism, realism and technicity. They are incompatible with the uniqueness of human 
experience but they are not at all incompatible with bounded subjectivity within paradigm-bound 
qualitative research. 
The similarity between objectivity and subjectivity can also be seen in how many qualitative 
researchers seek to generalise their findings. The original aim of objectivity as a requirement for 
sound research was to enable the efficient production of generalisable knowledge by eliminating 
the most unreliable variable, the subjective researcher. In such a system, knowledge could only 
be sanctioned if it could be replicated by anyone, anywhere, using the same sanctioned methods. 
If it could be replicated by anyone, anywhere, then its findings could be safely generalised. 
A few researchers still believe in absolute replicability, but most other researchers, especially 
qualitative researchers, no longer do. Yet they still seem to believe in the generalisability of their 
qualitative knowledge, much to the amusement or dismay of scientistic researchers. Believing in 
the generalisability of their own and others' experiences means they assume such experiences to 
be the same as those of others whom they expect will see things the same way, share the same 
perspective, and experience the same possibilities. Generalisability assumes it is possible to draw 
others into the bounded persona of the paradigm researcher. At its worst, generalisability 
assumes this ontological assault on human uniqueness is acceptable.  
The odd and cognitively dissonant assumption of the generalisability of qualitative data is 
revealed in the way researchers write up and apply their research.  
Anyone who uses words like "is" and "are" when reporting their research, or words like "should" 
or "must" when describing applications of their findings, appears to be generalising their 
personal experiences. To avoid the appearance of generalising one's subjective observations, one 
might use expressions like "seems" or "appears to" in place of "is" and "are." To advise or 
prescribe behaviours flowing from one's research, one could use words like "might" or "could" 
instead of "should" or "must." To do the former is difficult, as evidenced by all of this paper that 
is written conventionally, except for the first sentence of this paragraph. That the latter is 
difficult is evidenced by the weakened force of the second and third sentences in this paragraph 
that sound wishy-washy.  
I am not advocating that qualitative researchers imprison themselves in a linguistic straightjacket 
of self-conscious censoring. Rather, I am trying to bring to light the powerful assumptions of 
technicity that persist, unacknowledged, even in the least scientistic qualitative research.  
As long as we believe that others can and should see the world as we see it (that "accurate" 
interpretations of experience are generalisable), we have still lost our unique place in the 
concrete world, detached ourselves from it, and taken up an objective "subject position" in the 
abstract world of our making (the place of "one" in the previous illustration). This is the other 
detachment that comes from thematisation, our personal detachment from our place in the 
concrete world, which reduces us to deficient personas with limited possibilities.  
This dual detachment -- detachment of phenomena from the concrete world of complex 
significance, and detachment of researchers from their own unique places in that concrete world 
-- renders the products of such detachment abstract, removed from the rich context of familiar, 
everyday reality. Detachment and the resulting abstraction render the products of research 
esoteric, exclusively accessible and significant only to the paradigm community that produces 
and sanctions them. This detachment and abstraction produce the differences between paradigm 
worlds and the "real" world and opens the chasm between theory and practice. Ironically, 
Ackroyd (1996) argues that qualitative methodology itself has become an esoteric field, 
detaching itself from the disciplines that produced and sustain it. It has even spawned its own 
discipline marker, specialist journals! 
C. Rationalism 
At the root of scientism and abstraction lies rationalism. Technicity is the full flower of 
rationalism. The seeds of technicity, rationalism, scientism and abstraction were planted in 
ancient Greece. Heidegger (1952/1977b) suggests that Plato sowed the seeds of technicity when 
Plato changed the meaning of "idea" (eidos). Heidegger says "idea" used to refer to the visible 
aspect of something, but that Plato 
extracts of this word...something utterly extraordinary: that it names what precisely is not and 
never will be perceivable with physical eyes...[idea] names and is also that which constitutes the 
essence in the audible, the tastable, the tactile, in everything that is in any way accessible. (p. 20) 
When "idea" no longer refers to what appears but to the invisible essential form of it, then our 
own experience becomes questionable and we need a higher source to validate our experience. 
Plato provided forms as that higher source. Dark Age philosophers provided God. Descartes 
provided self-certifying rationality. No longer could knowledge emerge from some mysterious 
but pure revelation of reality. Now knowledge could emerge only when some knowing subject 
thought it. 
Our inheritance from Plato and Descartes, via a coterie of other rationalist thinkers including 
Husserl, is a belief in "rational" thinking that deprecates "unsupported" common sense and 
individual experience, that denies the existence of phenomena that do not conform to the 
approved vision of the world, and that dismisses any thinking that departs from rationalism's 
methodological prescriptions. This is Heidegger's description of the rule and law of science, 
Kuhn's description of paradigmatic science, and modern social studies of knowledge's 
description of science (e.g., Hacking, 1992; Lynch, 1993; Pickering, 1992, 1993). It seems 
scientism, rationalism and research cannot be disengaged from each other. 
The glorification of rationalism can be found in calls for more rigour in qualitative research 
(Ackroyd, 1996; Gordon, 1999; Hall & Rist, 1999; Seale & Silverman, 1997), in calls for more 
Husserlian phenomenology and grounded theory (Giorgi, 1997; Goulding, 1998; Rennie, 1998; 
Roberts, 1997) and the ultimate harnessing of rationalism in the form of quantification and use of 
machines to analyse qualitative data (Green, Wind, Krieger, & Saatsoglou, 2000; Hyde, 2000). 
The irrationality and even thoughtlessness of practice make it highly dismissable by rationalist 
researchers who feel they know better how to do things properly (rationally) (Skinner, Tagg, & 
Holloway, 2000). The privileging of rationality even leads some qualitative researchers to seek 
avenues to knowledge about subjects' thinking that reach beyond subjects' personal accounts 
(e.g., Roberts, 1997). This illustrates the arrogance that flows from rationalism. 
But why has rationalism emerged as a defining characteristic of the epoch of technicity? The 
answer probably lies in rationalism's capacity to create a sense of control. Control is a central 
value in the epoch of technicity. The control Heidegger is talking about relates to the power to 
define and assign, to place within a framework (Gestell) (Heidegger, 1952/1977b).  
The urge to control is manifest in research in the proliferation of new terms and names for 
familiar phenomena, in the propensity to analyse everything into its component parts as a way to 
get a handle on things, and in the popularity of charts, graphs and models that can capture and 
stabilise dynamic relations -- all the products of abstract rationalism and scientism (e.g., Green et 
al., 2000; Pieters, Bottschen, & Thelen, 1998; Valentine, 1996).  
For example, Burgess (1984) named and defined four kinds of researcher: the complete 
participant, the participant as observer, the observer as participant and the complete observer. 
Tracer studies introduced the world to "tags," (Hornby & Symon, 1994) obviously because 
"documents" and "records" were inadequate names. Analysis has introduced us to seven stages in 
the hermeneutic process (Forster, 1994). It has also given us twenty statements to establish 
personal identity (Spitser, Crouch, & Stratton, 1973) and 31 categories into which to place 
responses to those twenty statements (Rees & Nicholson, 1994). To plot the dynamics of 
knowledge construction, we have the repertory grid (Kelly, 1955). To categorise data, we can let 
a computer build NUD*IST trees for us.  
This is a quite different notion of control than we normally associate with the power to govern or 
the power to manipulate. It relates more to ontological power, the power to say what and how 
something is. The familiar gap between theory and "real life" represents a struggle over the 
ontology of the phenomena and people in the worlds of research and life. When the jargon, the 
over-analysis and the cooked up models stretch the credulity of the practically inclined to 
breaking point, the gap between theory and practice opens like a groaning chasm. The dismissal 
of research and theory by business practitioners can be seen as a refusal to grant ontological 
control of the world of business to the forces of scientism, rationalism and abstraction, despite 
the observed commitment of some managers to positivist values (Skinner, Tagg & Holloway, 
2000). 
But is it possible to be a researcher without succumbing to scientism, rationalism and 
abstraction? Probably not. But I think it is possible to be a reflective scholar. What would 
scholarly qualitative reflection be like if it could escape the influence of the technicity paradigm. 
III. POST-TECHNICITY REFLECTION 
Post-technicity reflection (as opposed to research) would replace the conventional, rationalist 
belief in the theory-ladenness of all experience with a belief in the constitutive power of history 
and would legitimate personal experience.  
A. History 
In post-technicity reflection, history constitutes personal experience; history is what we 
experience. History does not mediate experience. It is not a theoretical filter through which we 
interpret experience. History is what we experience immediately. History is present to us and is 
experienced as future possibilities. History comprises all the stuff of life, past and present, linked 
and rendered significant by their relations to other stuff. History on this conception is represented 
in the previous illustrations by the interconnected spheres said to represent the dimensions of a 
culture, research themes and the there of researchers and others. History is the milieu in which 
we live our lives. It is the source of our experiences and what makes us meaningful. 
I don't mean this metaphorically. I mean that the life we experience - the trees, the people, the 
activities, the values that we live with - are historical. They were and they were significant before 
we experienced them. If they aren't before we experience them, then how do we experience 
them? Constructivists say we bring them into being by the way we understand them. I say we 
understand them because they are already when we encounter them. The constructivists may be 
speaking metaphorically because they subscribe to the mind/body duality that flows from 
rationalism and are comfortable distinguishing "reality" from our idea of reality. But I can't see 
the need or purpose for that distinction. (I agree with Heidegger's comment on the "scandal of 
philosophy." Kant once famously said that the scandal of philosophy is that philosophers still 
have not come up with a convincing proof for the existence of reality. Heidegger's riposte is that 
the scandal of philosophy is that philosophers are still looking for such proof.) 
This conception of history does not refer to the familiar and now oft-challenged product of what 
Heidegger (1927/1996) calls historiology. Historiology produces the tedious, contentious, 
rationalist narratives comprising strings of abstract "facts" of another time that we usually think 
of as history.  
In contrast, history for Heidegger is preserved human experiences that precede our own and that 
are handed down to us, not as discrete experiences but as the holistic world of significance, a 
world of things, relations and human purposes already known, all interconnected and there for us 
to experience immediately and holistically from our unique perspective among them.  
While the metaphysics behind this conception of history is interesting, it is more useful to our 
current purposes to explore the considerable significance of this conception of history for post-
technicity reflection. This conception challenges a popular assumption about the nature of the 
experiences we have when conducting research; that is, that we construct the significance of our 
experiences through interpretation. 
Heidegger maintains that the relations among things (the connections among the spheres in my 
illustration) pre-exist our experience of them and make experience possible by making things 
significant. Without those pre-existing relations, things have no significance, so we can't 
understand them. The significance of the world is historical because the relations among things 
that create their significance are historical, not made on the spot. History is the world made 
significant for us by history's preservation of how things have been related throughout history in 
the experience of others. Our own and others' previous experiences of relations among things 
prime us to experience similar things and understand and interpret things in similar ways.  
To understand this notion of historical relations determining the significance of our experience, 
consider the experience of walking into a home and being greeted by the fragrance of freshly 
baked cookies. The pleasant associations we have with the smell of freshly baked cookies are not 
created by us exclusively, and certainly not at the moment of walking in the door. They are 
memories of our own previous pleasurable experiences with cookie baking, and they tap into 
social memories of the meaning of home cooking and a caregiver welcoming us, and deeper 
human memories of being feed and protected by caregivers. Those memories swirl around us. 
They are not confined to some dusty file cabinet in the mind, waiting to be called up so we can 
interpret that lovely smell. They come to light because the fragrance has directed our attention to 
them. The fragrance is part of a holistic matrix of things and relations that say homely pleasures, 
care and love. Any part of that matrix could lead us to the rest of it. That matrix is what is 
represented in the spheres-and-connections illustrations.  
What is very interesting about this alternative account of experience, as the apperception of 
historical significance, is that it accords very well with recent accounts of how brains work. 
Brains are made of 10 billion neurons interconnected through a quadrillion synapses (a little 
more complicated than my spheres and connections illustrations). Most of those synapses 
develop over time through experience and education (a few are hard-wired).  
The synapses fire in response to stimuli. The stimuli determine what synapses will fire. They 
have the potential to fire in 101,000,000 permutations. Each firing is another experience, not all 
conscious. We do not control the firing of those synapses. We do not organise them. We cannot 
construct them at the moment of experience. Some of the synapses are strengthened through 
repeated firings, so they become habits of thought or experience (e.g., paradigm knowledge, 
brainwashing, neural programming). 
The historical synapses that develop after birth enable us to understand a world that makes sense. 
Before we understand the world, our brains fire meaninglessly, until what Pinker (1998) calls 
"patterns of thought" begin to form. These patterns of thought allow us to have meaningful 
experience because they tap into the significance (interconnectedness) of the historical world. 
Stimuli triggers synapses along well-trodden paths and we experience something familiar. When 
we experience something unfamiliar, our brain struggles to find a familiar path - that's why we 
mistake strangers for friends, and describe unfamiliar things as being like something else. 
The point is that, according to brain science at least, meaningful experience requires the firing of 
pre-existing synapses. We can't construct meaning from experiences because we can't order our 
synapses to fire along particular paths. We don't have to construct meaning from experiences 
because experiences are always already meaningful. Babies do not construct the sense and 
meaning of their mothers' voices or smells. The significance of these stimuli gradually emerges 
as pleasant associations with other stimuli generate patterns of thought in the baby. Babies don't 
have to rationally interpret these stimuli to construct their significance. Experience grants that 
significance. That experience does not have to pass through a rational filter (a theoretical 
framework) in order for the stimuli to get meaning. The experience comes complete with its own 
significance. 
I am not suggesting that brain science has nailed down the definitive explanation of experience 
and "proves" that Heidegger's account of history is right. But it is interesting that brain science 
has come up with this account of brain function which runs counter to prevailing constructivist 
and rationalist ideas about how the mind works and how we experience the world. It seems to at 
least invite more careful scrutiny of the assumptions of rational constructivism that underpin our 
sense of what we are doing in research. We should at least entertain the possibility and 
implications of history rather than rationality as the source of meaning. 
But does this account of the historical givenness of significance mark a return to a form of 
uncritical realism and absolute truth that leaves no room for subjectivity or the personal 
dimension of experience? If we don't make meaning ourselves but rather experience meaning as 
historically given, won't we all just travel the same paths, understand the same meaning, and 
have the same possibilities? And if we are constantly swathed in a holistic, interconnected world 
of historical significance, how are we not overwhelmed by stimuli and meanings? Can we only 
know the world holistically, or is it possible to focus our attention on something? The source of 
personal, as opposed to communal, experience in a holistic, historically given world is discussed 
below. 
B. Personal Experience 
We influence how much of the world we will experience by how open we are to it. How open we 
are to the world is determined by how we understand ourselves. Heidegger's notion of self-
understanding was alluded to in the earlier sections on thematisation and the discussion of "the 
there" and personas. Using a spatial metaphor, how we understand ourselves - as researchers, as 
parents, as Catholics - determines the "shape" of our openness. The shape of our openness (our 
there) determines what can fit into it, what I am open to, what I can understand. 
For example, a person who understands herself as a quantitative researcher will be open to what 
can be counted and measured. A person who understands herself as a qualitative researcher will 
be open to what can be interpreted. Their research questions and areas of thematic specialisation 
will further shape the openness of both. Both people can adopt the persona of the other, at which 
time their openness will change shape and they will experience differently. Both people can also 
adopt other personas, such as mothers or daughters or brides or joggers. These personas will also 
reshape their openness. The shape of our openness can change from moment to moment. This 
should highlight that a persona is nothing like a persistent self. It is only a fleeting self-
understanding. People are free to choose their personas or to not choose one at all, to just be. 
People who understand themselves as personas, who conform to a conception of a certain type of 
person, are, in Heidegger's terms, inauthentic - not really themselves. They become "one", doing 
what one does. Heidegger's critiques of technicity, science, rationalism and research are all based 
on their requirement that people operate inauthentically, that people accept a persona that limits 
their openness to the world and their possibilities. When one's openness is constrained, one has 
fewer possibilities - for understanding, for action, for decisions. Further, when one is inauthentic, 
one's possibilities are no longer unique. They are the same as those of others adopting the same 
persona. To be authentic is to have all one's unique possibilities. I suspect that these unique 
possibilities account for creativity, vision, leadership, innovation - all the traits that distinguish 
individuals from their conformist associates. 
As someone committed to scholarly reflection, I prefer to inquire without imposed boundaries so 
I reject the persona of qualitative researcher and try to maintain an outsider perspective. But if I 
try to avoid a persona when doing my scholarly work, do I then begin to see the world as anyone 
else rejecting a persona would? No. The world of significance that I experience is granted to me 
by history, but while I share a lot of world with people who share my history, there are always 
parts of the world that are not given to me because of the limits of my history, my education, my 
socialisation, my acculturation. (The same applies even if I adopt a paradigm-determined 
persona.) Everything isn't always there for me to know, regardless of how open I am. This 
creates the possibility of error and ignorance, which in turn encourages modesty about what I can 
understand. This modesty is another characteristic of scholarly reflection missing from 
technicity-influenced research, which is predicated on the hubristic belief that we can know 
everything as long as we have enough time and resources to find out.  
So post-technicity reflection is characterised by a belief in the historical givenness rather than the 
rational construction of meaning and by a commitment to scholarly reflection characterised by 
authentic (personal) engagement with the world rather than to paradigm-bound research 
characterised by inauthentic engagement with a thematised world. But how does the activity of 
reflection differ from research, and how might it affect the practice of qualitative research.  
C. The Activity Of Reflection  
The activity of scholarly reflection begins with merely opening up to the historically given world 
of significance. But this opening up is not a research activity; it is a human activity and requires 
no special expertise. It is our essential nature to be open to the world around us, to smell the rain, 
to notice someone's new haircut, to find something interesting.  
Heidegger believes it is our fundamental nature to be practically rather than theoretically open to 
the world. To be practically open means to do things with the world, to be active, to be engaged 
in human pursuits, to be hands on, to get our hands dirty, rather than "living in our heads."  
To be practically open to the world requires us to engage with the holistic world, to deal with 
things in their own context of relationships. To be theoretically open to the world requires us to 
detached things from their own context in order to study them thematically. For example, most 
scientists physically remove objects for study to their laboratory. As discussed earlier, with 
qualitative researchers this detachment is more commonly conceptual, removing people from 
their holistic context and studying them as employees, clients, citizens or consumers. To be 
theoretically open to the world also requires us to adopt a subject position disengaged from the 
world. What moves the subject position away from the world is the desire to observe it on our 
terms rather than interact with it on its own terms.  
To understand this practical/theoretical distinction, we need to keep in mind the notion of 
historically granted significance. Some critics of Heidegger maintain that research has a 
"practice" of its own and also deals with things contextually (e.g., Rouse, 1987). This is true and 
Heidegger (1927/1996, p. 328) acknowledged as much, but the context that Heidegger is 
privileging is the common, historically granted context that belongs to the thing itself rather than 
the esoterically constructed one that emerges through research. So even the ethnographer and 
action researcher are not practically engaged with what they study because they see what they 
study not as what it is but as a phenomenon for study. Even if they spend a lot of their time doing 
rather than viewing, they still distance themselves to a "subject position" at least some of the 
time. This influences the "shape" of their there and so limits their openness.  
Opening up to the world practically is a passive activity. Dreyfus (1991) called it "mindless 
coping," just getting on with life, doing ordinary things. It's mindless because it doesn't require 
any rational engagement. Heidegger (1927/1996) calls this passive opening up understanding, a 
simple "taking in" of what is there to experience.  
Understanding is not a rational act. It is not a mental act. It is not a conscious act. It is not an 
intentional act. It is not an intellectual act. It does not require a mind. It does not require any 
concepts or language. A newborn baby understands the world, not because of its mind but 
because of its human nature, its ability to be witness to the existence of the world.  
As a practical phenomenon, understanding often takes the form of action. I understand my car 
when I unlock the door, slide in, put the key in the ignition, turn it on and drive away. I don't 
have to know anything about internal combustion engines or physics to do this. I don't have to 
think about the car to understand it. We understand things by using them, by doing with them as 
their context allows. A chilling example of this kind of practical understanding comes from Bob 
Dylan: "He understands your orphan with his gun." 
Of course, sometimes we just can't do with things. Sometimes things are broken or missing or 
they don't work as we expect. Then we have to puzzle over them, maybe take them apart 
physically or mentally, and maybe just kick them in frustration. Or maybe our problem is that we 
are dealing with an immaterial phenomenon like culture or depression that we can't just use. In 
such situations, our understanding isn't enough. We need more. We need to "interpret" our 
understanding. (We don't interpret the world; we interpret our understanding of the world, what 
we have been open to.) 
But the Heideggerian concept of interpretation does not involve adding anything to the 
understanding, especially not adding anything from some theoretical filter through which we 
experienced the phenomenon we understand. Interpreting is not at all a synthetic process. It is 
also not a "bracketing" process of stripping anything away, including any theoretical filters. 
Rather, it involves attending more closely to our understanding, reflecting on it. Since what is 
being experienced is a holistic, historic world of interrelated phenomena, whatever phenomenon 
is experienced initially can lead to other phenomena to which it is linked as part of its context. 
Interpretation involves noticing and following phenomenal links to a context of wider 
significance. There are elements of this kind of interpretation in grounded theory's "constant 
comparison" process (without the theme or category to which the data is being compared). But 
the qualitative approach that seems closest to this approach to interpretation is the 
immersion/crystallization process (sans the crystallization). This process studies everything on a 
topic, following phenomenal links even when they lead beyond traditional paradigm-sanctioned 
sources. (Cassell & Symon, 1994). 
A visual metaphor for interpretation might be an expanding circle of light from a spotlight. 
Understanding illuminates a certain region of the historical world. As the circle grows, more and 
more of the area can be seen in the light. Interpretation illuminates a larger portion of the 
historical world already given to the understanding but not noticed because it wasn't important to 
practical functioning. What makes the light grow is our attention, which expands the shape of 
our there to make it more open. While understanding is passive opening up, interpretation is 
active opening up.  
Interpretation is not a frenzied journey of discovery or creation or construction but a calm and 
respectful contemplation of what is given to understanding. Interpretation does not happen in our 
heads. It happens in the world. Those phenomenal links that are being followed are not in our 
heads. They are all around us and can be understood if we are open to them.  
Interpretation broadens and deepens our understanding of the world by enriching the significant 
context of our experiences, which we can then share with others or preserve, thereby contributing 
to the complexity of the world of significance. But much of the enriching potential of 
interpretation is lost when research paradigms render parts of the phenomenon's context 
irrelevant, insignificant, off-limits, outside the domain of interest, beyond the research question, 
beyond the light. 
But could it be that this account of scholarly reflection is simply advocating an alternative 
paradigm to the technicity paradigm? Will it not produce the same conformist, inauthentic 
behaviour and its own thematic areas of interest? 
I think the notion of reflection is more appropriately understood as an attitude rather than an 
action plan or paradigm. This attitude of human passivity and intellectual modesty toward 
experience acknowledges the givenness (rather than constructedness) of experience and shows 
respect for (rather than control of) the phenomena of experience (the world). This attitude is 
expressed in what Heidegger refers to as the methodological maxims of phenomenology: "Not to 
flee prematurely from the enigmatic character of phenomena, nor to explain it away by the 
violent coup de main of a wild theory, but rather to accentuate the puzzlement." (Heidegger, 
1975/1988, p. 69). 
But what researcher can tolerate the enigmatic character of phenomena? Better to analyse it, 
categorise it, name it, label it, diagram it, model it and render it clear if not controllable. What 
researcher can resist proffering a theory that can be cited and recited widely so people have a 
shortcut to understanding that saves them examining their own personal experiences of the 
world? To researchers it matters little if such a theory violates the ontological integrity of 
phenomena while emphasising the power of rationalism. And what researcher would actually 
commit to print, "I don't get it." Even the pseudo-Socratic affectation of claiming to raise 
questions rather than provide answers is nothing more than what scientists think of as "defining 
the problem." It is an attempt to set the research agenda, define the research domain. 
Unanswered questions are the engine that drives Kuhnian "normal science," but unanswerable 
questions are the bane of a researcher's existence (and a total nightmare for students). 
But don't these maxims constitute just one more prescription for one more ology? Just another 
alternative paradigm for another specialist discipline? Just one more persona for us to adopt? Just 
one more set of rules and techniques to constrain the shape of our there and limit our possibilities 
for understanding?  
If the maxims are a prescription for anything, they are a negative prescription -- stop trying to get 
a handle on phenomena, stop forcing phenomena into frameworks not their own, stop trying to 
make knowledge. But such exhortations are not intended to constrain our theres, to limit our 
personal engagement with the world as a paradigm prescription does. Rather, they are seeking to 
bring to light more possibilities for such engagement. Heidegger (1927/1996) considered this our 
prime responsibility to others, to help them see their own enhanced potential as human beings. 
The methodological maxims of phenomenology say, "try me and see what happens." 
Also, I don't see Heideggerian phenomenology/post-technicity reflection as a discipline. It has no 
specialist domain, it has no rule and law, and no phenomenologist/scholar would or could 
presume to enforce binding adherence. Heideggerian phenomenology/reflection is what Heim 
(1982, p. 206) calls "the performance of philosophic thought." Phenomenology is the study of 
phenomena, reflective engagement with all that can be experienced and with the sources of that 
experience. Nothing is excluded in this holistic domain. I read the maxims of phenomenology as 
a description of one possible way to relate to phenomena. It is not the only way; it is not even the 
optimal way in all circumstances. But it is a decidedly different way to relate to the world than 
researchers adopt. It is a way of relating to the world that we more commonly expect of artists, 
so-called primitive peoples, the mentally ill, the unconventional (professional or social misfits) 
and, most recently, "transformational leaders" in business (e.g., Bass, Waldman, Avolio & Bebb, 
1987; Gundrey, Prather, & Kickul, 1994; Katzenbach, 1996; Kotter, 1990; Spreitzer & Quinn, 
1996; Story, 1995; Teal, 1996). 
This way of relating is not prescribed by phenomenology. It is not a paradigm to be adopted and 
adhered to. Rather, this way of relating to the world is highlighted as an overlooked possibility 
available to human beings who tire of a paradigmatic existence. It cannot be a prescription or a 
paradigm because the uniquely personal nature of the relationship between a person and the 
world cannot be standardised or generalised. Heideggerian phenomenology / reflection as an 
approach to qualitative "research" will have as many manifestations as there are scholars and 
these scholars need not identify with phenomenology as a credo; they don't even need to know 
its name. 
IV. PHENOMENOLOGICAL QUALITATIVE REFLECTION 
So what might qualitative reflection (as opposed to research) look like if we were to conduct it 
phenomenologically?  
A. A Phenomenological Attitude 
If we accept that the methodological maxims of phenomenology are more an attitude than a 
paradigmatic set of prescribed techniques, how might such an attitude influence our approach to 
qualitative reflection? What might be facilitated and what might be inhibited by such an attitude? 
We can begin by assuming that such an attitude would inhibit those inclinations fostered by 
technicity: scientism, specialisation, abstraction and rationalism, and either facilitate something 
altogether new or make something familiar more common. 
If scientism were inhibited, our concerns about rigour would change. Instead of being concerned 
with researcher's methodologies, the hoops they've jumped through to gain paradigm approval, 
we would redefine rigour in terms of openness and engagement. The most rigorous would be 
those most committed to following phenomenal links in many directions to make their 
understanding more complex and rich. Triangulation might be employed not to increase 
reliability or validity but to enrich the paths of understanding. The most rigorous would also be 
those who were the most hands-on and involved with the phenomena of interest. This would 
suggest that participant observation and action research (without the observation and research) 
might be combined to create an approach called participant action, which might just get rid of 
researchers altogether! This is only a half facetious suggestion. In truth, to overcome scientism 
we must lose our concern about rigour, about judging the reliability and validity of anyone's way 
of understanding the world. An attitude of reflection would value all experiences and 
perspectives and would make judgements about them only in terms of their relevance to one's 
own interests, activities, experiences or purposes, rather than in terms of the method of their 
genesis or the person who had them. The end of scientism would mean the democratisation of 
knowledge and the end of experts. I've worked in many business faculties where academics who 
began in business are often wary of undertaking what is called research because they feel they 
won't do it well. It is a great loss to our understanding of the world that such people think there is 
a right way to experience the world. Can we reconfigure qualitative research to encompass their 
ways of knowing?  
If specialisation were inhibited, the subdisciplines of qualitative research would disappear. 
Individual methods used to reflect would not reduce the scholar to a persona but rather would be 
shaped by the person using them. Also, multiple methods could be employed in combination, 
their choice determined by the phenomena to be studied rather than by the qualifications or 
persona of the scholar. The direction of one's reflection would be determined by one's practical 
purpose or aim, rather than by a thematic domain with which one identifies. This would probably 
mean an end to academic research for its own sake. Curiosity-driven research, powered by the 
will to master phenomena and stake out a domain as one's own, would be seen as the pointless 
indulgence of rationality that it is. All reflection would be purposeful and useful -- personally, 
socially or culturally. This does not preclude reflection on poetry or art or the behaviour of 
neutrinos. But it means that one needs to reflect within a practical context with the intention of 
doing something with what is understood, besides publishing a paper. Such non-specialist, 
purposeful reflection was undertaken by one of my research students. He wanted to understand 
how to exploit the fanaticism of football fans in marketing to them. Instead of doing standard 
market research to ask them directly about what pushed their buttons and made them part with 
their money, he explored the characteristics of fanaticism that emerged from psychology, 
sociology, theology, anthropology, literature, marketing and management. He then participated 
in the organised activities of football team supporter groups and interviewed self-identified 
football fanatics to see how their experiences and views fit into the wide range of characteristics 
he'd discovered from other sources. Then he related all that to the problems and opportunities of 
marketing football to such people. He thesis was deemed exploratory because it didn't offer any 
"wild theory" to explain away all the complexity, but it also got top marks because it was such a 
rich, boundaryless and yet useful study of such an interesting phenomenon.  
If abstraction of phenomena were inhibited, then theorising would not be required. Phenomena 
that haven't been abstracted from their historical context do not need to be theorised to be made 
meaningful. Grounded theory becomes unnecessary. If abstraction of scholars is inhibited, 
generalisation becomes even more dubious than it already is. While the homogenised and 
standardised experience of paradigm-defined personas has only been deemed generalisable by 
convention, the individual experiences of qualitative scholars enmeshed in the holistic context 
remain purely personal. But that does not mean they have no social value. Instead of abstraction, 
which is removing phenomena from their context, qualitative reflection would involve 
aggregation of individual, personal experiences to enrich the context in which phenomena of 
interest exist. By aggregating the understanding of multiple scholars by identifying the linkages 
between all the related phenomena they understand (by interpreting that understanding), 
understanding is not generalised but enriched so that it has more relevance to more people. 
If rationalism is inhibited, people will be less inclined to retreat "inside their heads" to ponder 
life's mysteries and more inclined to look outwards to the world around them. The idea of 
withdrawing from life to reflect would be replaced by increased openness to the environment, to 
the circumstances of experience. Since the environment of experience is complex, problems and 
solutions would not be simplified or only partially addressed based on paradigm limits. More 
importantly, rationalism facilitates the arrogance of constructivism, the delusion that we are free 
to make meaning and that our worth is dependent on our facility for making meaning. This feeds 
the elitism that says some of us are better interpreters of experience than others and have more 
right to be heard, consulted and believed. The end of rationalism would mean that the "quality" 
of a person's interpretations would be based on their openness, their attention to "reality" and 
their capacity to help others see the richness and complexity of experience rather than provide 
them with answers that shut down the openness of others. In our desk research, we have 
doubtless already experienced the difference between authors who give us authoritative answers 
that we can cite in our papers and those that draw us away from our papers to ruminate and 
ponder and marvel at the breathe and perspicacity of some people. 
While all of these kinds of changes might cause us to modify and maybe reject the techniques we 
use in qualitative research, the changes are more attitudinal than technical. As such, they can be 
implemented even if we stick with some of our existing techniques for finding out about the 
world. Even a quantitative study (sans the statistical analysis) can enrich our understanding of 
the world, but we need to view the results of such a study as mere raw material for 
understanding, not as a substitute for engagement with phenomena. Likewise, we can continue to 
conduct depth interviews and do ethnography, action research, participant observation and even 
grounded theory, so long as our attitude to our processes and to their outcomes remain modest, 
respectful to phenomena and engaged with the phenomena of experience. So long as we continue 
to recognise that our experiences are no more remarkable or creditable than anyone else's, our 
interpretations are no more insightful than anyone else's, and our methods give us no more 
control over our experiences and interpretations than the mindless coping of the average Joe or 
Josie, then we can continue to do our qualitative research with a phenomenological attitude. That 
would be a transitional phase on the path to phenomenological reflection. A more complete 
embrace of such reflection would move away from qualitative research techniques based on 
scientism, specialisation, abstraction and rationalism. 
B. Phenomenological Reflection in Practice 
Some practical characteristics of phenomenological reflection might include different aims, 
emphasis on literature reviews, abandonment of research instruments, personalised, unique 
reports by authentic inquirers, and a different understanding of communication. 
The aim of phenomenological reflection is not definitive truth, knowledge making, or even 
persuasive argument. Rather, phenomenological reflection aims to raise questions and enrich 
understanding. Consequently, there would be no competition for paradigm control. Contrary 
viewpoints would not need to be reconciled. Knowledge would not need to be verified or refuted. 
There would be no need for credentialed expertise or for legitimating academies. There would be 
no discipline boundaries to defend, extend or exceed. There would be self-identified scholars but 
no barrier to being one (the end of researchers and experts). 
Phenomenological reflection would get serious about the literature review, about reading more 
widely, more deeply, more historically. Reading outside paradigm boundaries enriches the world 
available to experience by beefing up the holistic matrix of significance available to our 
openness. The literature review now is done with the benefit of keyword searches through 
thematised databases, making it difficult to escape the reduced domains of our disciplines and 
the fleeting currentness of our knowledge. If the richness of our experiences comes not just from 
our present circumstances but from our education and socialisation (part of our history), then the 
more we read and reflect on the past, the greater can be our understanding of the significance of 
the present and the potential of the future. This does not mean we should read more 
historiological accounts of the past. It means we should read the original, historic accounts 
written by our intellectual "heroes," rather than settle for second-, third- and fourth-hand potted 
versions of their thought. It is only in reading the originals that we benefit from our heroes' 
unique and personal engagement with the world. While reading commentaries and accounts of 
our heroes' engagement with the world still enriches our understanding, it also takes our focus 
away from the "the matter at hand" and turns it toward the hero as a character in some author's 
narrative. Secondary accounts also report the commentator's experience rather than the hero's. 
(So go read Heidegger for yourself!) 
Phenomenological reflection would also take longer because we wouldn't have reductive 
instruments to gather data. We would have to watch and listen and do by ourselves or with 
others. Then we'd have to share our experiences with each other and try to understand their 
significance without prescribed techniques and methodologies for interpretation. Understanding 
the significance of our experiences would involve trying to understand how everything we've 
learned fits together. "Research" would become a synthetic rather than analytic process, a 
complicating rather than simplifying process, a puzzle-creating rather than puzzle-solving 
process. Phenomenological reflection without the reductive instruments might also be cheaper. 
Inquirers only need libraries and time to do their work (and maybe communication technology). 
Reports on phenomenological reflection might become more like conversations with wise elders 
or perspicacious youngsters, people who speak only for themselves but whose messages are 
meaningful, inspiring and insightful. They would not provide answers. They would not make us 
feel knowledgeable. Rather, they would make us modest. Such people show us by their example 
what an individual can accomplish, the potential of an individual to understand the world. But 
they also show the limits of that understanding, how even the most wise and perspicacious 
individual still remains full of questions and wondering.  
Reports of reflection would be personal, unique, inspiring and insightful because the authors of 
these reports would be "authentic" and free to experience the world from their unique place in it. 
Phenomenological scholars cannot be confined to pre-designed roles. They are rarely predictable 
in their behaviour or decisions. They are likely to be seen as creative when creativity is 
understood as unconventional. This is because scholars manifest their ontological individuality 
by rejecting paradigm conformity. As a result, the experiences they have to report are 
enlightening rather than familiar. 
But how might it be possible for authentic scholars having unique experiences without the 
benefit of paradigm filters communicate those experiences so others can understand them? It is 
the shared understanding made possible by those filters that allows social knowledge making and 
communication-as-shared-meaning. How can we communicate our experiences to others without 
those filters to homogenise our experiences to create common ground? 
When I ask that question in such a provocative way, I am trying to highlight two key 
assumptions about communication that Heidegger rejects. We assume that communication either 
requires common ground or creates common ground. And we assume that communication is a 
representational act, that it re-presents our experience to others so they can share it.  
In contrast, Heidegger (1927/1996) maintains that communication should highlight our 
differences. A French philosopher heavily influenced by Heidegger has argued that 
communicating "spaces" us rather than bonds us together (Nancy, 1991). Both say 
communicating highlights what is different about us. I understand both these thinkers to be 
saying what is actually pretty obvious. When we open our mouths or word process our ideas, 
what becomes most obvious is that we are all different in our perspectives, our understanding, 
our interpretations. We try to communicate to overcome that difference. We feel that someone 
hasn't had the experience or knowledge we want to share and that's why they don't see things as 
we do or behave as we do or vice versa. Yet modern communication theory acknowledges that 
the intention of authors is irrelevant to the meaning that audiences "make" or take from what 
they read or hear, so we can't overcome difference by communication. I think the idea that 
communication involves shared understanding and common ground seems to be more 
aspirational than actual and I wonder if the sentimentality that surrounds the sharing/caring 
account of communication doesn't mask a more fundamental, technicity-influenced desire to 
control or be controlled - a desire to have everyone see things as I do, or a desire to hold the 
dominant view or at least a socially popular view rather than be out in left field. When we 
change the aim of communication from creating or exploiting common ground to highlighting 
human difference, then reporting on one's unique and personal qualitative reflection is not 
problematic. 
Heidegger moves even further from conventional thinking about communication by rejecting the 
representational assumption. To understand his position on this, we need to appreciate that 
Heidegger distinguishes between words and language. To Heidegger, words are to language as 
paint is to art. He thinks we are altogether too preoccupied with what he refers to dismissively as 
word-things. (This from a guy who has inflated and rewritten the philosophical vocabulary 
exponentially!) To him language is where life happens, where existence plays itself out. It is a 
place, a site, like our there. (Arguably, it is our there, but that is another paper!)  
When I report the results of a phenomenological reflection, the report becomes the site for 
experience. But it is not the site for a representation of my experience. It is a site for the matrix 
of significance that I experienced. The holistic, historical world of things, relations and human 
purposes exists there. Just as the matrix of significance (the world) that was granted to me made 
my experience and understanding possible, so too does the preserved matrix in the report exist as 
potential experiences for others. When someone reads the report (or when I re-read my work), 
our openness and any persona we bring to our reading will influence how we experience what I 
have brought to light in the report. In writing my report, I only facilitate an encounter with the 
world. I only direct a reader's attention to an area of the world. I do not control how others 
operate within that world or how they interpret the world (follow its linkages). They may 
experience something quite similar to my experience. They may experience something quite 
different. Consequently, when my report facilitates the experience of another, what is facilitated 
is not a re-enactment of my experience (the representational view). Rather, a new, personal, 
unique experience is enacted. 
This enactment will happen regardless of what we do, but some people try to thwart that free 
enactment by using overbearing words that demand compliance in thought and experience, 
words like "is" and "must" and "proves." These words have no place in reporting 
phenomenological reflection because all we can report is our personal experience, not any 
mythical "true state of affairs." Also, because we value and acknowledge difference, we don't 
have a transformational agenda in dealing with others; we don't want to make them think, 
understand, interpret or act like us. We also do not pursue or encourage conformity in these areas 
because the more diversity of experience that contributes to the evolving, historical matrix of 
significance, the richer our experiences will be and the more meaningful we will become. 
So if we are going to commit to phenomenological reflection as an alternative to qualitative 
research, we need to understand and re-evaluate our attitudes toward rigour, specialisation, 
rationalism, engagement with the "real" world, and the value of personal experience while 
revising our aims, our methods and how we frame and communicate our findings to others. But 
is this possible in the current academic climate around the world?  
V. GET REAL! 
Phenomenological reflection would be difficult, perhaps even foolish, in the present academic 
climate. The current academic paradigm is likely to favour (and reward) research over reflection 
because it too is shaped by technicity. Prevailing beliefs and values about education and 
knowledge require the continuous production of valid, esoteric, exclusive knowledge, knowledge 
that can only come from research. Many qualitative researchers have felt the disdain of positivist 
colleagues, reviewers, managers and policy makers whenever they attempt to be even a little 
phenomenological. Until the academic paradigm changes, we will still need to publish more 
rather than better papers. We will have to build reputations for ourselves. We will have to get 
through review processes. But I ask, "Do we have to play the game so well, so enthusiastically, 
so unreflectively?" 
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